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The [Indianapolis] law itself gave [women] existence : I am real ; they believed me; I count ; social
policy at last will take my life into account , validate my worth -- me, the woman who was forced
to fuck a dog ; me, the woman he urinated on ; me, the woman he tied up for his friends to use ; me,
the woman he masturbated in; me, the woman he branded or maimed; me, the woman he
prostituted ; me, the woman they gang-raped.
Andrea Dworkin , Pornography : Men Possessing Women , New York : Penguin Publishing
(1989) . Introduction xxx.

If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation , it is that no official , hjgh or petty , can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics , nationalism , religion , or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.
Majority opinion in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943) as quoted
by Judge Easterbrook in American Booksellers Association , Inc . v . Hudnut , 771 F .2d
323 , (1985) at 327 .

3

The rapidly increasing cry for forms of speech rationing is part of the "culture war" that
currently splits the social and political life of the United States. The individual battles ohhis war
can be defined along several lines. There is the struggle of minority groups against dominant
whites , and also a bitter struggle between minority groups. 1 We also face a neo-Marxist
economic battle between "the commons" and wealthy corporate America . There is a growing
conflagration between traditional religious groups and the supporters of a secular view of morality
and society . Finally, there is the complex struggle between men and women . These battles are
bitter and brutal , and participants fully recognize the power of speech and press in determining the
war's eventual victors. The stakes are higher than ever, and the intolerance for "unacceptable"
speech is growing .
Minority rights theoreticians make inequality arguments with great vigor. Constitutional
scholars have written copiously in recent years about the inability of African-Americans ,
Hispanics , gays, and lesbians to engage effectively in the so-called free market of ideas because of
the imbalance of power inherent in a racist society. 2 Hundreds of colleges and universities have
enacted speech codes that attempt to redress the imbalance by banning offensive racist , sexist, and
homophobic speech .3
The new scholarship emphasizing the inequality of speech is strikingly similar to the old
arguments about the need to balance economic equality against individual liberties. In the famous
Rawls formulation: "All social values--liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases

1
2

Witness the animo sity of many African-Americans against Koreans in the Los Angeles riots .
See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Campus Antiraci sm Rules: Constitutiona l Narratives in Collision , 85 NW. U. L. REV. 343 (1991).

3 See Nat Hento ff, "Speech Codes" on the Campu s and Problems of Free Speech, tn
. DEBATING P.C. 2 15 (Paul Berman ed., 1992).
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of self-respect are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all of these
values is to everyone's advantage ."4 Libertarians argue that these types of egalitarian measures
stifle individual effort and thus decrease prosperity for all.5 The issue arises: do we limit the
speech of the powerful and subsidize the speech of the disadvantaged in order to maximize the
public good?
In the culture battle between men and women, a group of feminist scholars lead by
Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin have focused their attentions on restricting and
chilling pornographic speech in the name of equality ; speech , they argue , that perpetuates male
dominance , sex abuse , and sexual discrimination. In this paper , I will examine the historical
development of the Supreme Court's current free speech conceptual framework while tracing the
challenges before the Court regarding the conflict between equality and First Amendment liberty
leading up to Hudnut. This paper will also discuss the philosophical foundations of MacKinnon's
unique challenge--found in the "model ordinance" and Only Words --to the status quo
Constitutional conceptual framework , demonstrating its flaws, dangers , practical problems , and
incompatibility with the Supreme Court's decisional framework .

I. Feminism, Catharine MacKinnon , and Pornography's Harms
Feminist legal theory consists of three fundamental strands , which for convenience may be
called the "difference ," "different voice," and "dominance" approaches . The "difference" strand ,
associated with the Equal Rights Amendment , is the least controversial and argues that women

4
5

JOH N RAWLS , A THEORY OF JUSTICE 75 (1975).
A good example of an economi c egalitarian piece of legislation is the progressive income tax.

5
should be permitted to compete on equal terms with men in the public world. The "different
voice" strand of feminist theory, associated with the work of Carol Gilligan, 6 asserts that there is a
distinctly female way of approaching moral and legal dilemmas that has been ignored in legal
doctrine. The third strand of feminist legal theory is the "dominance" approach which describes
gender inequality not in terms of arbitrary differentiation but in terms of the social subordination
of women . The "dominance" strand argues that rape , prostitution, and pornography are not
isolated social deviations , but extreme examples of the subordination of women that occurs in
many areas.
Catharine MacKinnon is the most prominent advocate for the dominance strand of
feminist theory . She is also the most significant force in rethinking rape, prostitution, and
pornography :
MacKinnon has been perhaps the most important force behind the burgeoning theoretical
literature in law on sex discrimination and feminist theory. With Andrea Dworkin ,
MacKinnon has developed what is probably her most controversial thesis: the idea that
pornography is a form of sex discrimination .. . . MacKinnon's work has generated a
dramatic shift in legal thinking and reoriented the terms of debate. 7
MacKinnon's contributions to feminist legal theory and the ongoing debate surrounding free
speech and pornography are unparalleled.
MacKinnon makes three basic claims. First, she suggests that severe harms are done to
women in the production of pornography , and that regulation of the material is necessary to
prevent these harms. Second, MacKinnon argues that pornography has a causal connection to
acts of sexual violence against women. Third, MacKinnon contends that pornography influences

6
7

See C. GILLIGAN , IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982)
Cass R. Sunstein, Book Review of FEMINISM UNMODIFIED , 101 HARV ARD LAW REVIEW 829 (1988).
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the attitudes of men and women in gender relations which produce discrimination and inequality.
MacKinnon's diagnosis of pornography as a form of sex discrimination has been criticized
from two perspectives.

Some critics deny that pornography is harmful. Others claim that there is

no gender specific harms from pornography because women also enjoy pornography.

These

arguments are weak at best. There is mounting evidence of the indirect causal link between
pornography and sexual violence. 8 Although there is no conclusive proof that antisocial behavior
is caused by obscene material, I will agree with Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Hudnut that:
"depictions of subordination tend to perpetuate subordination. "9 As MacKinnon wrote:

It is not the ideas in pornography that assault women: men do , men who are made ,
changed , and impelled by it. Pornography does not leap off the shelf and assault women .
Women could , in theory , walk safely past whole warehouses full of it, quietly resting in its
jackets. It is what it takes to make it and what happens through its use that are the
problem. 10

II. The Development of the Supreme Court's First Amendment Conceptual Framework
Since the Supreme Court ' s summary affirmation of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal ' s
decision in American Booksellers Association , Inc. v. Hudnut

11

which struck down MacKinnon ' s

anti-pornography ordinance enacted in Indianapolis , legal scholars and commentators have written
extensively about the MacKinnon-Dworkin

model statute : comparing the feminist approach to

pornography with the Supreme Court 's obscenity doctrine , 12 discussing the theoretical
8

See, e.g , ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY , FINAL REPORT (1986) ; PORNOGRAPHY AND
SEXUAL AGGRESSION (N. Malamuth & E. Donnerstein eds. 1984).
9

771 F.2d. 323 at 329.

lO CATHARINE MACKINNON , ONLY WORDS 15 (1993)

11
12

475 US. 1001 (1986).
See, e.g., JOAN HOFF , LAW, GENDER , AND INJUSTICE 331-49 ( 1991 ).
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implications and challenges that the feminist-inspired ordinances have on obscenity doctrine,

13

and

dissected the lower courts' opinions in Hudnut in light of these issues.

In all of these discussions ofMacKinnon's unique challenge to the Supreme Court,
however, little attention has been paid to the fact that the philosophy behind MacKinnon's antidiscrimination legislation at issue in Hudnut and found in her controversial book, Only Words, 14
not only challenges the Supreme Court's obscenity doctrine, but also challenges the conceptual
framework on which the Court has based much of its First Amendment jurisprudence. Moreover,
legal scholars and commentators have ignored the fact that Hudnut is only one in a series of cases
in which legislation barring sex discrimination gave rise to claims that questioned the Court's
conceptual framework. The uniqueness of Hudnut is that the Supreme Court was not able to
adhere to its First Amendment doctrines and still uphold the anti-sex discrimination legislation at
issue .
Accordingly , it is important to take a fresh look at Hudnut and all of the cases that
challenged anti-sex-discrimination legislation as violative of the First Amendment. A close
analysis will reveal not only that Hudnut does not conform to the Supreme Court's decisional
pattern, but also much about the Court's understanding of gender equality.
The Supreme Court's modern approach to the protection of free expression rights can, in
large measure , be traced back to opinions authored by Justice Holmes and Brandeis. Holmes and
Brandeis articulated their philosophical visions for the constitutional protection of free speech in

13
14

See , e.g. , Eric Hoffman , Note , Feminism , Pornography, and Law , 133 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1985).
CATHARINE MACKINNON , ONLY WORDS , Harvard University Press: Cambridge (I 993).
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early political speech cases. 15 Both Justices argued that the constitutional foundation for free
speech lies in the free marketplace theory. Holmes asserted that the suppression of speech
interferes with society's best mechanism for discovering the truth , 16 the marketplace of ideas. 17 In
Holmes' view, government should remain a bystander in the free speech arena. Brandeis later
extended the free marketplace theory of the First Amendment by specifically tying it to the search
for political truth. Free speech, Brandeis suggested, enhances democratic decision making and is
essential to self government.

18

Implicit in Brandeis' argument was the idea that by allowing a political minority the
opportunity to attain majority status through persuasion and debate, free speech would ensure the
prospects for peaceful social and political change . Consequently, both Holmes and Brandeis
expressed dissatisfaction with the Court ' s initial First Amendment test, the bad tendency test. 19 In
their view it gave the government too much power in suppressing minority political viewpoints
that the government deemed harmful. According to Holmes and Brandeis, the proper test would
only allow the government to suppress speech if the danger stemming from the speech was "so
imminent that it would befall before there was an opportunity for discussion. " 20

15

These cases include: Whitney v. Californ ia, 274 U.S. 357 (I 927) ; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (I 925) ; Schenck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (19 I 9); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919) ; Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) ;
and Abrams v. United States , 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
16

The belief that open discussion and debate will result in "truth " or consensus can be traced , at the very least, as far back
as the post-feudal humanist rhetoric of the Renaissance.
17
18

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S . 6 I 6, 630 (I 9 I 9)
Whitney v. California , 274 U.S. at 375

19

See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 ( 1925), specifically Justice Sanford 's majority opinion , for a classic formulation
of the bad tendency test. Under the bad tendency test, speech may be suppressed by the government if the speech has a tendency to
produce bad effects , even distant ones.
20

Whitney , 274 U.S. at 376-7.
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Holmes' and Brandeis' approach to the First Amendment was both reflective of and
responsive to a common disputing arrangement present in the cases they heard. In all of these
cases, the disputes centered around the same basic scenario: political minorities, members of the
radical left (communists) , had asserted free speech rights against efforts by the government to
restrict their political views. Out of this disputing arrangement , free speech rights became
associated with minority interests and calls for political change. In addition, free speech became
counterpoised to government regulation and defense of the status quo in society . This
perspective on the relationship between free speech rights, minority interests , and democracy was
the basis for the two ideas found in Holmes' and Brandeis ' approach to the First Amendment: (1)
that the protection of free speech rights would result in the protection of minority interests and
thus would preserve democracy 2 1 and (2) that free speech rights were negative liberties to be
protected from governmental interference. 22
The liberal approach to free speech of Holmes and Brandeis has generally prevailed as a
core component of the Supreme Court's First Amendment theory . The trend in the Court has
been to strengthen this approach and to broaden it to encompass expression traditionally thought
to be nonprotected , such as nude dancing, libel, and commercial advertisement. 23
The social maelstrom of the 1960's set the stage for such an expansion of the Court 's
liberal free speech doctrine. Vietnam protests , consumer activism, and the sexual revolution

21
22

23

Id. at 375-6.
Id. at 374.

See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (nude dancing can fall within the rubric of First Amendment
protection) ; Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council , Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (First Amendment protection extends
to truthful , lega l commercial speech) ; New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (seditious libel receives First Amendment protection unless
the remarks are made with "actual malice") .
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presented the Court with opportunities to broaden its interpretation of the First Amendment.
Most importantly, the civil rights struggle spawned a series of cases which linked the expansion of
free expression to the revolution underway in constitutional theory regarding the principle of
equality. The court began to recognize the free speech claims of civil rights activists by refining
its public forum and group association doctrines. 24 In this way, First Amendment free expression
rights became even more interwoven with minority interests and the democratization of American
society.

III. Reconciling Free Speech Rights with Anti-Sex-Discrimination Legislation: The Dilemma
A series of sex discrimination cases starting in the l 970's posed a fundamental
philosophical challenge to the Court's view of the First Amendment as an instrument of political
and social change. In these cases, the opponents , rather than the supporters of various
governmental anti-discrimination measures , attempted to invoke the First Amendment to support
their positions and constrain legislative attempts to equalize women's status. For the first time
since Holmes' and Brandeis' formulation of the Court's First Amendment doctrine , free
expression rights were asserted by the status quo against minority interests. These cases
presented a jurisprudential dilemma for the Court as they contradicted the Court's conceptual
framework. The Court was faced with the prospect of choosing between protecting minority
interests or protecting free expression rights. Moreover, such a choice posed a philosophical
dilemma for the Court, which perceived its role in American politics as the guardian of both free

24

See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina , 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (civil rights demonstration on state capital grounds is
constitutionally-protected expression in a public forum) ; Bates v. Little Rock , 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (NAACP ' s membership list
protected from compulsory disclosure under the First Amendment derivative right of association).
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expression and equal rights.
The first case to pit free expression rights against minority interests was the 1973 case of
Pittsburgh Press Co. V. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations. 25 In that case the
commission's enforcement of Pittsburgh's "human relations " ordinance prohibited the Pittsburgh
Press from running sex-designated help-wanted ads . The Pittsburgh Press argued that such a ban
was a prior restraint on First Amendment freedoms of expression, specifically freedom of the
press. In an effort to preserve minority interests without destroying its First Amendment
conceptual framework, the Court avoided the conflict between the values of liberty and equality
by employing a system of speech categorization. In its majority opinion , the Court argued that
the case did not involve viewpoint expression , but only commercial speech which proposed illegal
activity. Hence , the Pittsburgh Press Court ' s vision of commercial speech as expression far
removed from the core First Amendment concerns of democratic self-government , coupled with
the Court's liberal approach to gender equality allowed the Court to advance the pace of social
reform without reassessing its First Amendment framework and theory.
Following the Pittsburgh Press decision, the next series of cases offering possible
challenges to the Court ' s First Amendment framework involved the derivative right of freedom of
association . In the first of these cases , Hishon v. King & Spalding, 26 the conflict between free
expression and equality did not materialize . The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision ,
interpreted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as forbidding sex discrimination in law firm
partnership decisions. In so holding, the Court rejected King & Spalding's contention that such

25

26

413 U.S 376 (I 973).
467 U.S. 69 (1984).

12
an interpretation would violate the firms freedom of expression and association.

The association

in Hishon , like the advertisements in Pittsburgh Press , was found to be unworthy of constitutional
protection.

Again, the Court resolved the dispute through simple judicial categorization.

The next series of cases involving freedom of association claims and women ' s equality
claims involved the exclusion of women from men's clubs or service organizations.

27

The Court

ruled in favor of minority interests in all of these cases. Although these decisions were not based
solely on judicial categorization , the Courts did rely on a constrained approach. Fortunately for
the Supreme Court , which was committed to its First Amendment framework and to the
protection of minority interests, adoption of a more interventionist , positive liberties approach to
freedom of expression rights by the Court was not necessary to uphold the equality demands of
women in these cases .

IV. MacK.innon ' s Unique Challenge to the Court ' s First Amendment Framework.
Unlike any of the cases that preceded it, American Booksellers Association , Inc. v.
Hudnut offered a positive liberties challenge to the Court ' s First Amendment framework which
could not be ignored . The dispute in Hudnut centered on an anti-pornography ordinance inspired
by Catharine MacKinnon that was passed by the City of Indianapolis which would have tightened
governmental control over pornography.

28

27

See Robert s v. United States Jaycess, 468 U.S 609 (1984) ; Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of
Duarte , 481 U .S. 537 ( 1987) ; New York State Club Association , Inc . v. City of New York , 487 U.S. 1 (1988) .
28

The Indianapolis Ordinance is similar to other ordinances proposed acro ss the country about the same time that were also
supported by feminists and social conservatives. Los Angeles , Minneapolis , Cambridge , and Bellingham considered similar
ordinance s. The Bellingham ordinance was adopted and subsequently declared unconstitutional. The Minneapolis ordinance was
passed by the City Council and then vetoed by the Mayor.
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In Only Words and the Indianapolis ordinance , MacKinnon defines pornography:

Pornography is the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women , whether in pictures
or in words , that also includes one or more of the following : (1) Women are presented as
sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation ; or (2) women are presented as sexual
objects who experience sexual pleasure in being raped ; or (3) women are presented as
sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt , or as
dismembered or truncated or fragmented or severed into body parts; or (4) women are
presented as being penetrated by objects or animals; or (5) women are presented in
scenarios of degradation , injury abasement, torture , shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding,
bruised , or hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual; or (6) women are
presented as sexual objects for domination , conquest , violation , exploitation , possession ,
or use, or through postures or positions of servility or submission or display .29
Catharine MacKinnon intentionally avoids any use of the term "obscenity " to describe the
material she seeks to prohibit because of her dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court ' s definition
of obscenity and the premises behind its regulation . To be "obscene" under Miller v. California "a
publication must, taken as a whole , appeal to the prurient interest , must contain patentl y offensive
depictions or descriptions of specified sexual conduct , and on the whole have no serious literary,
artistic , political, or scientific value. 1130
This legal definition of obscenity emphasizes the lewdness and provocativeness of the
work and whether it offends community sensibilities. In contrast , MacKinnon's conception of
pornograph y:
. . .focuses on the woman depicted and on whether the depiction encourages men to
believe that the woman experiences sexual pleasury through brutalization or degradation .
Extremely graphic depictions of sexual intercourse might well qualify as obscenity , but
they would not constitute pornography unless they portrayed women as creatures craving
subordination . On the other hand, although a billboard depiction of a semi-nude , bound ,
and battered woman proclaiming that she loves being black and blue might not be sexually
shocking enough in a particular community to merit the label "obscene ," feminists would
see such a billboard as endorsing the physical subordination of women and thus as
29
30

.
.
Ind,an apohs Cod e @ 16-3( q).
.

.

.

Miller v. Califorru a, 413 U.S. 15, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419 , 93 S. Ct . 260 7 ( 1973) .
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pornographic.

31

It is irrelevant to MacKinnon whether a work has literary, artistic, political or scientific

value. As she asserts, "if a woman is subjected, why should it matter that the work has other
value?" 32 It does not take an in depth analysis ofMacKinnon's model ordinance to discover that it
would lead to widespread censorship. Much radical feminist literature, including Only Words, is
explicit and depicts women in ways forbidden by the ordinance. The ordinance would ban works
from James Joyce's Ulysses to Homer's Iliad; both depict women as submissive objects for
conquest and domination. MacKinnon's definition of pornography would include a story of a
woman given by her husband to his attackers in his stead. After a lengthy gang rape, the woman
if found lying dead at the door of the house. The husband cuts her corpse up into twelve pieces
and sends them to the family branches with whom he had nurtured close relations. That story ,
and therefore the book containing it, was in violation of the letter and spirit ofMacKinnon's
ordinance . A plaintiff would have a difficult time taking the writer to court because the story is
from Chapter 19 of the Book of Judges in the Old Testament. As we can see, "the law is so
broad and vague that God could be in the dock for passages in the Old Testament. '133
MacKinnon makes two basic contentions about pornography and its relationship to First
Amendment protection. First, she argues that pornography is not just speech. 34 Rather,
pornography is also a form of conduct (the practice of sex discrimination) and thus does not fall
under the umbrella of First Amendment protection. MacKinnon's strategy is clever . She argues
31
32

33
34

.
h
.
Anti-Pomograp y Laws and Frrst Amendment Values, 98 HARV ARD L. REV. 466 (1984) .
.

.

. .

.

Cathanne MacK.innon, Pornography, CIVIi Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV ARD CIV. RTS.--CIV. LIB. L. REV. 1,21 (1985).
NAT HENTOFF , FREE SPEECH FOR ME--BUT NOT FOR THEE 340 (1992).

CATHARJNE A. MACKINNON, Not a Mora l Issue , in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 146, 154 (1987).
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that pornography is a type of performative speech act like a minister's pronouncing a couple man
and wife or a jury's finding a defendant guilty:
Along with other mere words like "not guilty" and "I do ," such words are uniformly
treated as the institutions and practices they constitute, rather than as expressions of the
ideas they embody or further. They are not seen as saying anything ( although they do) but
as doing something. 35
Although it is easily understood that "not guilty" and "I do" are both speech and acts,
pornography pushes the bounds of the paradigm. For example, the only utterances in
pornography are usually written down or taped on film or videocassette.

Thus, the performer of

the alleged speech act is rarely in the presence of his or her audience. Can "speech" in such
circumstances be a speech act? That is, are speech acts iterable? If I want to marry Jennifer, can I
play a recording of a minister proclaiming us to be married, or would I need the minister's
presence? 36
The effects of pornography involves mental intermediation. Pornography affects how
people see the world. If pornography is what pornography does, so is other speech. Hitler's
orations affected how some Germans saw Jews. Communism is a world view, not simply a
Manifesto by Marx or a set of speeches. Religions affect socialization in the most pervasive way.
MacKinnon also argues that the First Amendment debate over pornography should
properly concern the values ofliberty and equality, not liberty and morality. Pornography's
subject matter is not sex, but power. Therefore, pornography should be regulated, not because it
offends the dominant community standards of sexual morality and lacks communicative content,
but for precisely the opposite reasons; because it validates dominant community standards of male
35
36

CATHARJNE MACKINNON , ONLY WORDS 12-13 (1993).
David C. Dinielli , Law and Equality: Only Words , 92 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 1945 (1994).

16
power and advocates harmful political ideas. MacKinnon argues that if the Court recognized the
Fourteenth Amendment's competition with the First Amendment, the equality guarantee limits or
even trumps the speech under question. Our Constitution, MacKinnon notes, is "a document that
accepts balancing among constitutional interests as method. '137 In suggesting that the Fourteenth
Amendment might limit speech rights, she performs her classic move. She recasts pornography as
an instance of sex inequality.
MacKinnon argues that the Court's notion of the free marketplace of ideas is based upon
the same naive and archaic laissez-faire confidence that inspired the concept of the economic free
marketplace, 38 a theory based on the presupposition that economic bargaining occurs between
relative equals . Under such a system, the government should not intervene. However, after
portions of the economy fell to monopolistic control , congressional regulations were needed to
restore economic balance. Accordingly , MacKinnon contends that the free marketplace of ideas
also suffers from monopolistic control. According to MacKinnon, men's voices dominate the
marketplace of ideas, and pornography is political propaganda that support's men's control. 39
Pornography , MacKinnon argues , silences women by terrorizing them. 40 Ironically, the hearings
regarding the Minneapolis ordinance appear to have been constructed to exclude meaningful

37

38
39

CATHARINE MACKINNON , ONLY WORDS 84 (1993).

Id. at 155.
Id. at 518.

40
MacKinnon takes this notion to its disturbing extreme by seem ing to claim that a woman's consent and enjoyment of sex is actua lly
coercion because the unequal relationship between men and women taints the way women perceive the sexua l experience. For a more in depth
examination of this issue see, e.g., Susan Etta Keller, Viewing and Doing: Complicating Pornography's Meaning , 81 GEORGETOWN LAW
JOURNAL (1993).
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dissent , attempting to silence her opponents. 41 In short, to MacKinnon the free marketplace of
ideas framework is inadequate. The preconditions necessary for the model to function in the case
of women are not present. Truth cannot be discovered when a powerful group--men--through
pornography make the voices of women inaudible. This inequity in the balance of power justifies
governmental intervention into the marketplace of ideas.

It should be noted that many women today do not perceive the world in MacKinnon's
terms . Indeed, many are hostile to her depiction. These women argue that "sex discrimination
has neither the nature nor the magnitude that MacKinnon suggests , and the world she describes -one of widespread and objectionable gender hierarchy -- is not the world in which they live."42
MacKinnon's response to women who defend the pornographers is that they are protecting the
power given to them by the male hierarchy. She blasts them, saying: "I want you to stop claiming
that your liberalism, with its elitism, and your Freudianism , with its sexualized misogyny , has
anything in common with feminism."43

V The Decision of the Court: Easterbrook Defends the Status Quo Conceptual Framework
Hudnut not only presented a direct challenge to the Supreme Court's obscenity doctrine
but also openly challenged the Court's First Amendment conceptual framework and its underlying
premises. MacKinnon pits women's free expression rights and equality demands against the free
expression rights of those who opposed the ordinance. In short, the Indianapolis ordinance was

41

Rowena Yeung, Book Note: THE NEW POLITICS OF PORNOGRAPHY by Donald Downs, 91 COLUMB IA LAW REVIEW 1271

(1991) .
42
43

Cass R. Sunstein, Book Review: Feminism and Legal Theory , 101 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 836 (1988).
CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 205 (1987).
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grounded in the notion that not one, but two sets of free expression rights were at stake.
Allowing men unrestrained speech silences women. Moreover, MacKinnon takes a positive
liberties approach--one which views free expression as requiring state intervention, not state
neutrality. MacKinnon demands that a new framework incorporating a positive liberties approach
to free expression rights is necessary in order to guarantee free expression rights to all groups.
MacK.innon's philosophical framework is clearly at odds with the Court's traditional framework.
Judge Easterbrook wrote the Seventh Circuit's response to the challenge contained in the
Indianapolis ordinance .44 In support of the court's holding that the ordinance constituted
discrimination on the basis of viewpoint , a form of thought control , Easterbrook relied on the
Supreme Court's traditional First Amendment framework.

45

Easterbrook asserted, as the

Supreme Court had in the past , that freedoms of expression are negative liberties :
The ordinance discriminates on the ground of the content of the speech. Speech treating
women in the approved way in -- sexual encounters "premised on equality " -- is lawful no
matter how sexually explicit. Speech treating women the disapproved way -- as
submissive in matters sexual or as enjoying humiliation -- is unlawful no matter how
significant the literary , artistic or political qualities of the word taken as a whole. The
state may not ordain preferred viewpoints in this way. The Constitution forbids the state
to declare one perspective right and silence opponents. 46
One of the things that separates our society from totalitarianism around the world is that we allow
the propagation of opinions that the government finds wrong or even hateful. The ideas of the
Klan may be propagated.

44

45

46
47
48

47

Communists may speak freely and run for office .48 The Nazi Party

Hudnut , 771 F.2d at 324.
Id. at 328.
Id. at 325.
.

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 , 23 L. Ed. 2d 430 , 89 S. Ct. 1827 (1969).
Delonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 , 81 L. Ed. 278 , 57 S. Ct. 255 (l 937).
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may march through a city with a large Jewish population.

49

Although Judge Easterbrook accepted the legislation ' s premise that pornography is part of
a socialization process that leads to women's secondary status , he nevertheless contended that
this premise simply demonstrated that pornography is powerful and effective speech and is
perhaps best answered by more speech. 50 He also refused to abandon the Court's free
marketplace of ideas model. He argued that although the free marketplace theory rests upon the
assumption that truth is more likely to emerge from discussion unrestrained by government , the
viability of the theory does not depend upon the actual emergence of truth .51 Easterbrook
rejected the feminist argument for regulation by writing :
A power to limit speech on the ground that truth has not yet prevailed and is not likely to
prevail implies the power to declare truth .... If the government may declare the truth ,
why wait for the failure of speech? Under the First Amendment , however , there is no such
thing as a false idea, so the government may not restrict speech on the ground that in a
free exchange truth is not yet dominant . . . . The Supreme Court has rejected the position
that speech must be "effectively answerable " to be protected by the Constitution. 52
Many scholars, including Ronald Dworkin , worry that MacKinnon's attempt to "equalize"
speech will result in government censorship of any material that might reasonably offend
disadvantaged groups . Since the Special Commission on Pornography and Prostitution adopted a
system similar to MacKinnon's in 1985, the Canadian Supreme Court has upheld laws restricting

49 C 11·
. cert. dented;
. 439 U.S. 916 , 99 S. Ct. 291 , 58 L. Ed. 2d 264 (1978).
o m v. Sm,.th , 578 F. 2d 1197 (7!h Cir.),
50

51

52

Id. at 329.
Id. at 330.
Id. at 330-1.
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hate propaganda

53

and obscenity , 54 relying on equality principles . The repercussions of these

decisions are not what MacKinnon would have hoped . One opinion piece in the New York Times
has noted that MacKinnon has become the target of widespread anger among Canadian artists ,
writers , and activists . Apparently , Canadian authorities have used the terms "degrading and
dehumanizing" -- terms lifted directly from MacKinnon's model ordinance-- to justify seizing
55
lesbian, gay, and feminist material and fining a bookstore owner for selling a lesbian magazine .

Easterbrook forcefully defended the Supreme Court ' s framework , arguing that it correctly
dealt with the complexity of the relationship between the constitutional values ofliberty and
equality. Easterbrook opined:
Free speech has been on balance an ally of those seeking change . Governments that want
stasis start by restricting speech. Culture is a powerful force of continuity ; Indianapolis
paints pornography as part of the culture of power. Change in any complex system
ultimately depends on the ability of outsiders to challenge accepted views and reigning
institutions . Without a strong guarantee of freedom of speech , there is no effective right
to challenge what is.56
Judge Easterbrook correctly argued that the Indianapolis ordinance sought to redefine
pornography as political expression. 57 In so doing , the ordinance not only attacked the Court ' s
obscenity doctrine , but also its traditional free speech categories .

VI . Conclusion
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See Regma v. eegstra, 1990 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.).
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See Butler v. Regma, 1992 1 S.C.R. 452 (Can.).
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55 Leanne K atz, C ensor's Helpers, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 4, 1993 at 15.
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Id. at 332 .
Id. at 329 .
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The disparity in outcomes between other anti-sex-discrimination cases and Hudnut
stemmed from the difference in the array of challenges that Hudnut brought before the Court.
Only Hudnut offered direct challenges to the Court 's First Amendment framework , its vision of
gender equality, and its institutional role . Given these additional challenges, the Supreme Court ,
could not easily use the constrained and categorizational methods. It could not adhere to its First
Amendment doctrines and framework and still find in favor of the Indianapolis ordinance . To
uphold the ordinance , given its philosophical assumptions, the Court would have had to alter its
use of traditional free speech categories, adopt a new First Amendment conceptual framework
based on positive liberties, and reorient its approach to gender equality . From both a
philosophical and institutional level, MacKinnon asked too much from the Court .58
The equalizing theory in speech turns out , on some mild deconstruction , to have a not-sohidden agenda to create a revolutionary new society that is egalitarian toward gender, among
other things.. Ironically, subjugated speech cannot be rescued by individuals or associations
without political clout. Egalitarian speech results will probably be obtained by groups with
superior organizational powers . Naturally , rival interest groups would lobby for government
"subsidies" of speech . This will be done in the name of equality, but the results will be otherwise.
Everyone would be equal, but in dramatic Orwellian terms more powerful groups would become
more equal.

58
When read together, the Court' s decisions seem to indicate that there is a link between the modern relationship between
freedom of expression as a civil liberty and legislative attempts to equalize women's status. The decisions appear to be shaped by the
Court's avowal ofliberal theory. In all of the cases other than Hudnut , the Court was willing to uphold anti-sex-discriminationwhen
the equality demand involved activity in the public sphere and when the legislation either regulated unprotected expression or was
viewpoint neutral. However, the Court in Hudnut was unwilling to uphold anti-sex-discriminationwhen the equality demand
involved the private sphere, when the assumptions in the dispute involved women' s sexual roles, and where the legislation arguably
regulated protected politicalexpression and was viewpoint discriminatory.

